We use the reinfection SIRI epidemiological model to analyze the impact of education programs and vaccine scares on individuals decisions to vaccinate or not. The presence of the reinfection provokes the novelty of the existence of three Nash equilibria for the same level of the morbidity relative risk instead of a single Nash equilibrium as occurs in the SIR model studied by Bauch and Earn (PNAS 101:13391-13394, 2004). The existence of three Nash equilibria, with two of them being evolutionary stable, introduces two scenarios with relevant and opposite features for the same level of the morbidity relative risk: the low-vaccination scenario corresponding to the evolutionary stable vaccination strategy, where individuals will vaccinate with a low probability; and the high-vaccination scenario corresponding to the evolutionary stable vaccination strategy, where individuals will vaccinate with a high probability. We introduce the evolutionary vaccination dynamics for the SIRI model and we prove that it is bistable. The bistability of the evolutionary dynamics indicates that the damage provoked by false scares on the vaccination perceived morbidity risks can be much higher and much more persistent than in the SIR model. Furthermore, the vaccination education programs to be efficient they need to implement a mechanism to suddenly increase the vaccination coverage level.
Introduction
The SIR model is an epidemiological model introduced in the beginning of the 20th century by Kermack and McKendrick (1927) and describes a Susceptible, Infected, Recovered epidemic process. The infection of a susceptible individual can occur at a certain infection rate when he/she contacts with an infectious individual, whereas after some time the infected individual can recover with a certain recovery rate and acquires some immunity, becoming resistant to reinfection. The SIRI epidemiological model extends the SIR model by allowing the possibility of reinfection due to partial immunity. Hence, the recovered individuals in contact with infected individuals can become infected again. The SIRI epidemic model was introduced by Tudor (1990) to model the spread of a herpes-type of infection in either human or animal population. The conditions for asymptotic stability of the disease-free equilibria and the endemic equilibria were derived by Moreira and Wang (1997) . The reinfection phenomena present in the SIRI model were also studied by Driessche and Zou (2007) and by van den Driessche et al. (2007) . Besides herpes, the authors claim that such a model is appropriate for tuberculosis, including bovine tuberculosis in cattle and wildlife. In a spatial context, the SIRI model and its phase transitions were studied by Stollenwerk et al. (2007 and by Stollenwerk and Jansen (2010) . Based on a cellular automata method, Song et al. (2011) showed that the reinfection can induce the persistence of the disease in the SIRI model with a spatial structure. The phenomenon of partial immune protection present in the SIRI model can also be found in infections caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae (Lipsitch 1997) , Neisseria meningitidis (Gupta and Maiden 2001) , tuberculosis (Gomes et al. 2004b ) and influenza A and B viruses (Andreasen et al. 1997; Hay et al. 2001; Ferguson et al. 2003) . Influenza A is an example of a virus that evolves over time resulting in continuous replacement of circulating strains able to reinfect hosts immune to earlier types (Palese and Young 1982; Andreasen et al. 1997; Ferguson et al. 2003) . The evolution of influenza A virus is caused by two processes that change the two proteins, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA), present in the surface of the influenza virus (Andreasen et al. 1997) . One process is the antigenic drift, and the other is the genetic shift. The genetic shift occurs as a genome reassortment, resulting in drastic alternation in HA or NA subtypes. The antigenic drift is related to small mutations in HA and NA, which are responsible for annual or biennial influenza epidemics. Cross-immunity is high between similar strains but very low between genetically different strains (Chamchod and Britton 2012) . Therefore, reinfection and imperfect vaccination can occur due to the presence of multi-strains. Influenza often requires new vaccines before each annual epidemics (Davies et al. 1983; Sonoguchi et al. 1986; Ferguson et al. 2003) . Childhood diseases like measles and rubella also have imperfect vaccines (Moghadas 2004 ). The SIRI model can be considered a simplified version of multi-strain models with partial cross-immunity and imperfect vaccination (Gomes et al. 2004a (Gomes et al. , 2005 Aguiar et al. 2008 ).
The theory of vaccination games probably started with the work of Fine and Clarkson (1986) . Bauch and Earn (2004) used the SIR model to study the impact of the changes of the perceived morbidity relative risk on the individuals' decisions between to vaccinate or not. Galvani, Reluga, Chapman and many other authors conducted several studies about how health policies should be designed and implemented to drive the vaccination coverage level to the utilitarian community optimum instead of the level attained according to the individuals' self-interest (Reluga et al. 2006; Galvani et al. 2007; Cojocaru and Bauch 2009; Reluga and Galvani 2011; Liu et al. 2012; Shim et al. 2012; Bauch and Bhattacharyya 2012) . Basu et al. (2008) considered a modified version of the SIRS model to simulate transmission of four representative types of the human papilomavirus (HPV). They observed that public perceptions regarding cervical cancer, genital warts, and HPV vaccination generate vaccination levels far lower than those that maximize the overall health-related utility for the population. The SIRI model differs from the SIRS model by allowing the recovered individuals to become directly infected, without previously passing through the susceptible class. Buonomo et al. (2008) considered a nonlinear SIR model with information dependent vaccination, i.e., they introduce a feedback mechanism in the epidemic model which describes the influence of information on the vaccination coverage level obtained by a vaccination campaign. In Bauch and Earn (2004) and in this paper, the available information and the vaccination campaigns are exogenous factors that can modify significantly the vaccination coverage level. Chen (2006) observed that the availability of an imperfect vaccine in a susceptible-infected epidemic model can lead to multiple endemic equilibria and the introduction of a subsidy for vaccination can rise the disease prevalence by increasing the practice of risky behaviors in sexually transmitted diseases. Reluga (2009) found multiple vaccination Nash equilibria resulting from two interacting subpopulations in an SIS model. Liu et al. (2012) studied the effect of the vaccination cost on the multiple Nash and the utilitarian equilibria in a chickenpox vaccination model. Here, we also obtain multiple vaccination Nash equilibria provoked by the possibility of reinfection, that is a characteristic captured by the SIRI model and inexistent in the SIR model.
For diseases in which vaccination is not compulsory, individuals take into account different aspects when deciding between to vaccinate or not, such as the probability of becoming infected and also the adverse consequences that might result from both infection and vaccination. The morbidity relative risk is the ratio between the morbidity risk from vaccination and the morbidity risk from infection. The morbidity relative risk is one of the most relevant information for the susceptible individuals to make their decisions between to vaccinate or not. Susceptible individuals decide to vaccinate or not with some probability that measures their uncertainty. In vaccination models, the probability of vaccination for each susceptible individual determines his/her vaccination strategy. For each susceptible individual, we construct his/her vaccination expected payoff, depending upon his/her vaccination strategy and the population vaccination strategy. The relevant terms that appear in the construction of the susceptible individual vaccination expected payoff are the following: (i) the susceptible individual vaccination strategy; (ii) the population vaccination strategy, that is the mean of all the susceptible individuals vaccination strategies; (iii) the morbidity relative risk; (iv) the probability of infection for a vaccinated individual; and (v) the probability of infec-tion for a non-vaccinated individual. In this paper, we add to the vaccination expected payoff introduced by Bauch and Earn (2004) a term corresponding to the probability of infection for a vaccinated individual due to imperfect vaccination (see Sect. 3).
A population vaccination strategy is a Nash equilibrium if no single susceptible individual is able to increase his/her expected payoff by changing his/her vaccination strategy from the population strategy (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) . A population vaccination strategy is an evolutionary stable vaccination (ESV) strategy if no small group of susceptible individuals are able to increase their expected payoff by deviating their vaccination strategy from the population strategy (Maynard-Smith 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998 ). An ESV strategy is a strategy that, if adopted by the population, can not be invaded by a competing strategy adopted by a small group of individuals. Hence, the ESV strategies are more robust than the Nash equilibria that are not ESV strategies, and so more likely to be observed in reality (see Sect. 2).
We study the ESV strategies dependence upon the morbidity relative risk and upon the parameters of the SIRI model. Our analysis asks for a detailed bifurcation analysis, differing from the analysis in Bauch and Earn (2004) where bifurcations do not occur. The most relevant quantity for our bifurcation analysis is the basic reproductive number, that is the expected number of new cases of infection produced by a typical infected individual in a susceptible population (Heesterbeek 2002) . We introduce the basic reproductive bifurcation threshold that decreases with the reinfection rate. For values of the basic reproductive ratio below the basic reproductive bifurcation threshold, we prove that there is a unique ESV strategy for each morbidity relative risk. Hence, there is a single vaccination scenario corresponding to the unique ESV strategy, and so our result has similar qualitative, but not quantitative, features to the results obtained by Bauch and Earn (2004) . However, for values of the basic reproductive ratio above the basic reproductive bifurcation threshold, there are values of the morbidity relative risk, such that there exist three Nash equilibria, with two of them being ESV strategies. This phenomenon is not captured by the SIR model and introduces two new scenarios with relevant and opposite features for the same level of the morbidity relative risk: the low-vaccination scenario where individuals vaccinate with a low probability; and the high-vaccination scenario where individuals vaccinate with a high probability. For the high-vaccination scenario, we prove that the vaccination expected payoff and the probability of vaccination does not increase with the morbidity relative risk. Furthermore, we show that the individuals vaccination expected payoff is higher at the high-vaccination scenario than at the low-vaccination scenario (see Sect. 4).
We introduce the evolutionary vaccination dynamics for an homogeneous population, where the expected probability of vaccination of the population evolves along time such that the individuals payoff increase, based on the replicator or evolutionary dynamics theory (Maynard-Smith 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Nowak 2006) . In the vaccination dynamics, the strains evolve along time and the partial cross-immunity is due, mainly, to the new strains. For values of the basic reproductive ratio below the basic reproductive bifurcation threshold, we prove that the unique ESV strategy is a global stable fixed point. However, for values of the basic reproductive ratio above the basic reproductive bifurcation threshold, we prove that the dynamics are bistable for some values of the morbidity relative risk: The two ESV strategies are stable fixed points of the evolutionary vaccination dynamics; and the Nash equilibrium that is not an ESV is the boundary vaccination threshold between the basin of attractions of the two stable equilibria. Hence, if the individuals adopt vaccination strategies such that the expected probability of vaccination of the population is smaller than the boundary vaccination threshold, then the population vaccination strategy is trapped in the low-vaccination scenario that is undesirable for the population. On the other hand, if individuals adopt vaccination strategies such that the expected probability of vaccination of the population is larger than the boundary vaccination threshold, then the population vaccination strategy is in the high-vaccination scenario (see Sect. 5).
The existence of the low-vaccination and the high-vaccination scenarios that are stable equilibria of the evolutionary vaccination dynamics contrasts significantly with the case of a single vaccination scenario showed by Bauch and Earn (2004) . In the presence of the two possible vaccination scenarios, vaccination scares and vaccination education programs can have a higher impact on the population vaccination strategy than in the case of a single vaccination scenario. For values of the basic reproductive ratio above the basic reproductive bifurcation threshold, we determine a low and a high morbidity threshold for the morbidity relative risk, such that (i) for values of the morbidity relative risk below the low morbidity threshold there is only the high-vaccination scenario; (ii) for values of the morbidity relative risk above the high morbidity threshold there is only the low-vaccination scenario; and (iii) for values of the morbidity relative risk between the low and the high morbidity threshold, the two vaccination scenarios exist. A vaccine scare can wrongly increase the perception of the morbidity relative risk above the high morbidity threshold, such that a catastrophe can occur, and so the population moves abruptly from the high-vaccination scenario to the low-vaccination scenario, provoking a large and quick decrease in the vaccination expected payoff. After a vaccine scare, to drive the population from the low-vaccination scenario to the high-vaccination scenario, the vaccination education programs need two effects to be successful: (i) to decrease the perception of the morbidity relative risk below the high morbidity threshold; and (ii), if the perception of the morbidity relative risk is higher than the low morbidity threshold, to increase the population vaccination strategy above the boundary vaccination threshold. A possible efficient mechanism can consist in offering vaccines and/or make it compulsory, at least to part of the population.
Vaccination Nash and ESV Strategies
In this section, we define the Nash and the evolutionary stable vaccination strategies. We classify them in terms of the morbidity relative risk r and of the vaccinationinfection risk index π , that we also introduce in this section.
As in Bauch and Earn (2004) , we denote by P the probability that a susceptible individual will choose to vaccinate. This probability P is the individual's strategy in the vaccination game. The vaccine uptake level in the population is the proportion of individuals who will be vaccinated and, hence it is the mean of all strategies that will be adopted by the individuals of the population. We denote the vaccine uptake level or the proportion of the population vaccinated by p, i.e., the population vaccination strategy.
Let r v denote the morbidity risks from vaccination and r i denote the morbidity risks from infection. We define the morbidity relative risk r by r = r v /r i .
Let π v ( p) denote the probability of a non-vaccinated individual to become infected and π v ( p) denote the probability of a vaccinated individual to become infected for a vaccination coverage level p in the population. We define the vaccination-infection risk index π by
The payoff of a non-vaccinated individual is −r i π v ( p) and the payoff of a vaccinated individual is −r v − r i π v ( p).
Definition 1
The vaccination expected payoff E(P, p) ≡ E(P, p; r ) expressed in r i units is defined by
Using the usual concepts of game theory, we will define the Nash and the evolutionary stable vaccination strategies that are more likely to be adopted by the individuals.
Definition 2 For a given morbidity relative risk r ≥ 0, the population vaccination strategy P * is a vaccination Nash equilibrium, if
for every strategy Q ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, if the population vaccination strategy is the Nash equilibrium P * then no single individual has the incentive to change his/her strategy of vaccination to any other strategy P = P * . Since the vaccination-infection risk index π is continuous for the SIRI model [see (8)], we state the following lemma that will be used later.
Lemma 1 (Nash equilibria) Let us assume that the vaccination-infection risk index π is continuous. The population vaccination strategy P * is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, P * satisfies one of the following conditions:
(i) P * = 0 and r ≥ π(0); or (ii) P * ∈ (0, 1) and r = π(P * ); or (iii) P * = 1 and r ≤ π(1).
By Lemma 1, for every P * ∈ (0, 1), r = π(P * ) is the unique morbidity relative risk such that P * is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, we define the Nash vaccination expected payoff map E :
where p = P * is the Nash equilibrium. By Lemmas 1 (ii) and (2), we have, for p ∈ (0, 1),
Hence, the Nash vaccination expected payoff map E is minus the probability of infection for a non-vaccinated individual. Again, by Lemma 1 (i), we observe that for p = 0, the vaccination expected payoff is constant
for every r ≥ π(0). For p = 1, by Lemma 1 (iii), we observe that the vaccination expected payoff attains a minimum at r = π(1), given by
and a maximum at r = 0, given by E(1, 1; 0) = −π v (1). Hence,
Now, suppose that all individuals were opting for a vaccination strategy P and a proportion ε of individuals (instead of a single individual) opt for a new vaccination strategy Q. Hence, the new population vaccination strategy is
The vaccination expected payoff of the individuals with vaccination strategy P is
and the vaccination expected payoff of the individuals with vaccination strategy Q is
We observe that both vaccination expected payoffs E(P, p) and E(Q, p) depend upon the vaccination strategy of the individuals and on the proportion ε of the individuals opting by the new vaccination strategy. The vaccination expected payoff gain function
Hence, the vaccination expected payoff gain function E P→Q ( p(ε)) measures the incentive that a group of individuals, of proportion ε, has to change their vaccination strategy from P to Q.
Definition 3 For a given relative morbidity risk r ≥ 0, the population vaccination strategy P * is an evolutionary stable vaccination (ESV) strategy, if there is a ε 0 > 0, such that for every ε ∈ (0, ε 0 ) and for every Q ∈ [0, 1], with Q = P * ,
Hence, the population vaccination strategy P * is an ESV strategy if any small group of individuals that choose a different strategy Q obtain a lower payoff than those choosing P * .
Lemma 2 (ESV strategies) Let us assume that the vaccination-infection risk index π is continuous. A population vaccination strategy P * is an ESV strategy if, and only if, P * satisfies one of the following conditions:
(i) P * = 0 and r > π(0); or (ii) P * ∈ [0, 1], r = π(P * ) and π is strictly decreasing at P * ; or (iii) P * = 1 and r < π(1).
Furthermore, a strategy P * is a Nash equilibrium that is not an ESV strategy if, and only if, P * satisfies the following condition:
(iv) P * ∈ [0, 1], r = π(P * ) and π is not strictly decreasing at P * . Now, we present some extensions of the previous definitions that we will use in the next sections. For a given relative morbidity risk r ≥ 0, the population vaccination strategy P * is a left (resp. right) ESV strategy if there is a ε 0 > 0, such that for every ε ∈ (0, ε 0 ) and for every Q < P * (resp. right Q > P * ),
The population vaccination strategy P * is a left (resp. right) weak ESV strategy if there is an ε 0 > 0, such that for every ε ∈ (0, ε 0 ) and for every Q < P * (resp. right Q > P * ),
The population vaccination strategy P * is a weak ESV strategy, if P * is a left and a right weak ESV strategy. Assuming the continuity of the vaccination-infection risk index π , we observe that a weak ESV strategy P * is a vaccination Nash equilibrium, i.e., for all Q ∈ [0, 1],
Lemma 3 (weak ESV strategies) Let us assume that the vaccination-infection risk index π is continuous. (i) P
Proof of Lemma 1 (3) is satisfied if, and only if,
Hence, P * = 0 is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if π(P * ) ≤ r . (3) is satisfied if, and only if,
and for Q ≤ P * , (3) is satisfied if, and only if,
Hence, P * ∈ (0, 1) is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if π(P * ) = r . Case (iii) P * = 1. For Q ≤ P * , (3) is satisfied if, and only if,
Hence, P * = 1 is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if π(P * ) ≥ r .
Proof of Lemma 3 For all
By (4) and continuity of π , there is ε 0 > 0 sufficiently small such that for all 0 < ε < ε 0 , π is left strictly decreasing at P * if, and only if,
Hence, P * ∈ (0, 1] is a left ESV equilibrium if, and only if, r ≤ π(P * ) and π is left strictly decreasing at P * ,
The other conditions of Lemma 3 follow in a similar way.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof follows from Lemma 3 and from the following observations: (i) P * = 0 is a (resp. weak) ESV equilibrium if, and only if, P * is a (resp. weak) right ESV equilibrium; (ii) P * ∈ (0, 1) is a (resp. weak) ESV equilibrium if, and only if, P * is a (resp. weak) left and right ESV equilibrium; and (iii) P * = 1 is a (resp. weak) ESV equilibrium if, and only if, P * is a (resp. weak) left ESV equilibrium.
Vaccination Expected Payoff Dependence upon the SIRI Model
In this section, we compute the vaccination expected payoff for the SIRI model. We perform the static analysis of the Nash vaccination expected payoff E, showing that E increases with the vaccination population strategy p and decreases with the basic reproductive number, for a given morbidity relative risk.
The Reinfection SIRI Model
The SIRI epidemiological model is described by the following ODE system
where: μ is the per capita mean birth and death rate; β is the mean transmission rate for a first infection;β is the mean transmission rate for reinfections; γ is the mean recovery rate and so 1/γ is the mean infectious period; p is the susceptible vaccine uptake level and so μp susceptible individuals, or newborns, move to the recovered individuals by vaccination. The novelty of the SIRI model is the introduction in the SIR model of a transition from the recovered class to the infected class, determined by the reinfection rateβ. Hence, the recovered individuals are only partially immune and reinfection can occur. The state variable S corresponds to the density of the susceptible and non-vaccinated individuals, the state variable I corresponds to the density of the infected individuals, and R corresponds to the density of the recovered and vaccinated individuals. We consider a population with fixed size, S + I + R = 1.
Let f = μ/γ be the mean birth and death rate in time units given by the infectious mean lifetime period, typically very small; σ =β/β be the ratio between the reinfection and infection rates; let R 0 = β/(γ + μ) be the basic reproductive number; andR 0 = (1 + f )R 0 the transformed basic reproductive number. The value of R 0 measures the intensity of the infection and the value of σ measures the force of the reinfection with relation to the first infection. We assume that σ ∈ (0, 1), because after a first infection an individual typically acquires some resistance to the reinfection. In the presence of partial cross-immunity, it is natural to assume thatβ < β, and so σ ∈ (0, 1), becauseβ measures, mainly, the immunity against the new strain and β measures, mainly, the immunity against all the strains. Furthermore, for some sexually transmitted diseases (Tudor 1990; van den Driessche et al. 2007 ), individuals reconsider some practices after recovering from a first infection, which leads to a smaller interaction with infected individuals and a smaller probability of being reinfected. Normalizing the time scale τ = t/γ , by the mean infectious period 1/γ , we obtain the following ODE system
The Vaccination Expected Payoff
Now, we will use the values of the state variables described by the ODE system (5-7) to define the probabilities of a non-vaccinated and a vaccinated individual to become infected for a given susceptible vaccine uptake level p. First, we observe that the state variables S, I and R depend, in particular, on p. In (5), we observe that in the susceptible class: (i) f represents the proportion of newborns; (ii) − f p represents the proportion of vaccinated susceptible individuals, or newborns; (iii) −R 0 S I represents the proportion of susceptible individuals that become infected; and (iv) − f S represents the proportion of susceptible individuals that die. Hence, the probability of a non-vaccinated individual become infected π v ( p) is the ratio between the susceptible individuals that become infected −R 0 S I and all the individuals that leave the susceptible class without vaccination −(R 0 S I + f S), i.e.,
In (7), we observe that in the recovered and vaccinated class: (i) f p represents the proportion of vaccinated susceptible individuals; (ii) I represents the proportion of infected that become recovered; (iii) −σR 0 R I represents the proportion of recovered individuals that become infected; and (iv) − f R represents the proportion of recovered individuals that die. Hence, the probability of a recovered or vaccinated individual to become infected π v ( p) is the ratio between the recovered or vaccinated individuals that become infected −σR 0 R I and all the individuals that leave the recovered or vaccinated class −(σR 0 R I + f R), i.e.,
By (1), for the SIRI model, the vaccination-infection risk index is
By (2), for the SIRI model, the vaccination expected payoff E(P, p) ≡ E (P, p; r, R 0 ) is
SIRI Stationary States
Here, we present the critical vaccine uptake level and the stationary states for the SIRI model.
Definition 4
The critical vaccine uptake level p c : 
The value p c ≡ p c (R 0 ) ≤ 1 is called the critical vaccine uptake level because, as shown in Lemma 4, p c is the vaccination boundary between the disease-free stationary state I * ( p) = 0 and the endemic stationary state I * ( p) = A + √ B − C p. We note that the notation p c ≡ p c (R 0 ) = +∞ means that, for this value of R 0 , there is only an endemic stationary state, and there is no disease-free stationary state for any vaccine uptake level p ∈ [0, 1]. The basic reproductive ratio R 0 = 1/σ , above which we have p c = +∞, is the reinfection threshold (Gomes et al. 2004a, b; Fig. 1 ). By (10) below, we observe that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma 4 The stationary equation given by (5) is
The stationary equation given by (6) is the disease-free stationary state I * ( p) = 0 or the endemic stationary statẽ
Hence, applying (10), we obtain
where
The positive solution is
2 ) = −B 1 /C 2 . Now, we observe that the endemic stationary value vanishes, I * ( p) = 0, for the critical vaccine uptake level p c ∈ (0, 1) presented in Definition 4.
The Stationary Vaccination Expected Payoff
Here, we derive the stationary vaccination-infection risk index and the stationary vaccination expected payoff for the SIRI model. We prove that the stationary vaccination expected payoff increases as the vaccination probability increases.
Theorem 1 (Stationary vaccination-infection risk index) For the SIRI model, if 0 ≤ p < p c , the stationary probability of a vaccinated individual to become infected is given by
and the stationary probability of a non-vaccinated individual to become infected is given by
Furthermore, the stationary vaccination-infection risk index π(
p) ≡ π( p; R 0 ) is π( p) = f f +σR 0 (A+ √ B−Cp) − f f +R 0 (A+ √ B−Cp) if 0 ≤ p < p c 0 if p c ≤ p ≤ 1 .
Proof of Theorem 1 The proof follows from applying the formulas presented in Lemma 4 to (8).
By Lemma 1, (i) for p = 0, the 0-probability vaccination Nash level region is implicitly given by r ≥ π(0, R 0 ), (ii) for every p ∈ (0, 1), the p-probability vaccination Nash level curve is implicitly given by r = π( p, R 0 ), and (iii) for p = 1, the 1-probability vaccination Nash level region is implicitly given by r ≤ π(1, R 0 ) (see Fig. 2 ).
For Fig. 2 The p-probability vaccination Nash level curves. In blue it is denoted the 0-probability vaccination Nash level region, and in red the 1-probability vaccination Nash level region. In b, we show the blowup of a around R 0 = 4, to exhibit the 1-probability vaccination Nash level region. We observe that: for p = 0, the left level point is R L 0 (0) = 1 and the critical level point is R M 0 (0) ≈ 2.001; for p = 1, the left level point is R L 0 (1) = 4 and the critical level point is R M 0 (1) ≈ 4.002; the maximum morbidity relative risk is r M ( p) = 1/3 for every p. The other parameters are f = 0.001 and σ = 0.25 (Color figure online) maximum point of π with respect to R 0 . Let the maximum morbidity relative risk r M ( p) of the p-probability level curve be Fig. 2 ). We observe that, (i) the left level points at p = 0 and p = 1 are R L 0 (0) = 0 and
does not depend upon p, as we will show in (11) (see Fig. 2 ).
By (9) and Lemma 4, the stationary vaccination expected payoff E(P, p) ≡ E(P, p; r, R 0 ) for the stationary SIRI model is 
Theorem 2 (SIRI vaccination expected payoff) The stationary Nash vaccination expected payoff E
: [0, 1] → [−1, 0] for the SIRI model is E( p; R 0 ) = f R 0 I * ( p)+ f − 1 if 0 ≤ p < p c 0 if p c ≤ p ≤ 1 . Furthermore, for 0 ≤ p < p c , ∂ E( p; R 0 ) ∂ p = − ∂ I * ∂ p fR 0 (R 0 I * ( p) + f ) 2 > 0 ∂ E( p; R 0 ) ∂ R 0 = − f (1 + f )I * ( p) +R 0 ∂ I * /∂ R 0 (R 0 I * ( p) + f ) 2 < 0 0
where the stationary value of infected individuals I * ( p) is given by Lemma 4. Furthermore, E( p) = 0 is a global maximum, for every p ≥ p c .

Recall from Sect. 2 that the Nash vaccination expected payoff is
E( p) = E( p; r ) = E( p, p; π( p)),
for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. For p = 0, E(0) = −π v (0), and for p = 1,
for all 0 ≤ r ≤ π(1). Hence, (i) for every p ≥ p c , E( p) = 0 is a global maximum; (ii) for every p < p c , E( p) increases with p and so the worst case appear when the morbidity relative risk r is above the vaccination-infection risk π(0) and the ESV strategy is not to vaccinate p = 0 (see Fig. 3 ). Furthermore, E( p) decreases with the basic reproductive number R 0 .
In Fig. 2 , we observe some regions where the vaccination Nash level curves intercept. Hence, there might exist more than one vaccination Nash equilibrium for the same relative morbidity risk. By Theorem 2, the vaccination expected payoff is higher at the Nash equilibrium with higher vaccination probability. The existence of these multiple vaccination equilibria will be studied in the next section.
Proof of Theorem 2 The stationary Nash vaccination expected payoff is
Case p c ≤ p ≤ 1 E( p; R 0 ) = 0 and so p is a global maximum. 
Vaccination Scenarios
In this section, we study the Nash and the ESV strategies effects on the vaccination population strategy depending upon the morbidity relative risk and upon the basic reproductive number.
Basic Reproductive Bifurcation Thresholds
We will introduce the basic reproductive bifurcation and critical thresholds and the low and the high morbidity relative risk thresholds 4.
Definition 5 The basic reproductive bifurcation threshold is
Furthermore, a basic reproductive ratio R 0 is small, if R 0 ≤ R B , and large, if R 0 > R B .
As usual, we consider the hypotheses that f is sufficiently small such that 1/ √ σ < R B < 1/σ . We observe that when σ =β/β tends to zero, R B tends to +∞.
Definition 6
The basic reproductive critical threshold is
Hence, R C = R B / √ σ and 1 < R B < 1/σ < R C . We observe that the critical level points at p = 0 and p = 1 are R M 0 (0) = R B ≈ 2.001 and R M 0 (1) = R C ≈ 4.002 (see Fig. 2 ).
Lemma 5 The vaccination-infection risk index π attains its unique local (and global) maximum at the point
Furthermore, the maximum morbidity relative risk r M ( p) of the p-probability level curve is
By Lemma 5 and Theorem 1, we obtain
We also observe that
Proof of Lemma 5
By (8), we obtain
Hence, ∂π/∂p = 0 if, and only if, (i) ∂ I * /∂ p = 0 or (ii)
Case ( 
Hence, for R 0 ∈ (R B , R C ) the vaccination-infection risk map π( p) attains its maximum at p M ∈ (0, 1) given by (13). For R 0 ≥ R C , the vaccination-infection risk map π( p) attains its maximum at p M = 1.
We observe that the derivative of the vaccination-infection risk map at p = 0 satisfies the following properties (see Fig. 5 ):
The vaccination-infection risk map has the following properties: 
, and π(1) > 0 (see Fig. 6 for R 0 = 4.001); (iv) for R 0 > R C , π( p) is strictly increasing for p ∈ [0, 1] (see Fig. 6 (right) for R 0 = 4.003).
Definition 7
For large basic reproductive ratios R 0 > R B , the low morbidity threshold is r ≡ r (R 0 ) = π(0); and the high morbidity threshold is r ≡ r (R 0 ) = π( p M ).
Vaccination Scenarios for Free Morbidity Relative Risk
For free morbidity relative risk r = 0 diseases, we will show that the reinfection threshold R 0 = 1/σ plays the following role, (i) for R 0 ≤ 1/σ , the left E SV strategy p c eradicates the disease; and (ii) for R 0 > 1/σ , the E SV strategy corresponding to full vaccination coverage 1 does not eradicate the disease. 
(iii) P * = 1 is an ESV strategy.
Proof of Theorem 3 Case
Hence, by Lemma 3 (i) and (iv), we get that P * = p c is a left ESV strategy and a weak right ESV strategy. By Lemma 3 (ii) and (iv), we get that P * ∈ ( p c , 1] are weak ESV strategies. Furthermore, there is no other Nash equilibrium.
Hence, by Lemma 2 (iii), P * = 1 is an ESV strategy. Furthermore, there is no other Nash equilibrium.
For a free morbidity risk disease, this theorem reinforces the relevance of the reinfection threshold R 0 = 1/σ : (i) For R 0 < 1/σ , the left ESV strategy P * = p c gives the lower bound for the Nash equilibria of vaccination uptake level of the population. Hence, the vaccine uptake level of the population P * ≥ p c guarantees that the population is at a disease-free stationary state. (ii) For R 0 = 1/σ , the ESV strategy P * = 1 gives the vaccine uptake level of the population that still reaches a disease-free stationary state. (iii) For R 0 > 1/σ , the ESV strategy P * = 1 gives the vaccine uptake level of the population. However, even a full vaccination level of susceptible individuals, or newborns, is not enough to eradicate the disease (i.e., to attain a disease-free stationary state). Hence, further action is needed like, for instance, to vaccine the recovery individuals as well (e.g., influenza).
Vaccination Scenarios for Positive Morbidity Relative Risks
In Theorem 4 below, we will show that for small basic reproductive ratios R 0 ≤ R B , there is a single E SV strategy (see also Fig. 4 , for R 0 = 1.5). In Theorem 5, we will show that for large basic reproductive ratios R 0 > R B and for morbidity relative risks between the low and the high morbidity thresholds r (R 0 ) < r < r (R 0 ), there are a low and a high ESV strategies P L and P H , with P L < P H (see also Fig. 4 , for R 0 = 3 and R 0 = 4.01). By Theorem 2, the expected payoff is larger for the high ESV strategy P H than for the low ESV strategy P L .
Vaccination Scenarios for Small Basic Reproductive Ratios
Here, we characterize the Nash and the ESV strategies for small basic reproductive ratios R 0 ≤ R B and positive morbidity relative risks.
Theorem 4 (Small basic reproductive ratios) For small basic reproductive ratios R 0 ∈ (1, R B ] and morbidity relative risks r > 0, the Nash equilibria are the following:
. For small values of the basic reproductive ratio, there is a unique ESV strategy for each morbidity relative risk. Hence, there is a single vaccination scenario corresponding to the unique ESV strategy, and so our result has similar qualitative features, but not the same quantitative features, to the results obtained by Bauch and Earn (2004) .
Vaccination Scenarios for Large Basic Reproductive Ratios
Here, we characterize the Nash and the ESV strategies for large basic reproductive ratios R 0 > R B and positive morbidity relative risks.
By Lemma 5, for large basic reproductive ratios R 0 > R B , we observe that 0 < r < r . Using Lemma 2, for every 0 < r < r , we will construct below the high vaccination strategies p H ≡ p H (r ; R 0 ) that are going to be ESV strategies.
Hence, p H (r ) is a continuous piecewise smooth map with a non-smooth point at r = π(1). For every R 0 ≥ R C , the vaccination-infection risk index π is increasing. For every 0 < r < r , let For large values of the basic reproductive ratio R 0 > R B , we have three cases to consider (i) r < r ; (ii) r < r < r ; and (iii) r > r : (i) for morbidity relative risks below the low morbidity threshold r < r , there is only one ESV strategy that is the high-vaccination scenario, but for some diseases, like influenza, there might be the need to take another actions, like to vaccine the recovered individuals, because there might not be a critical probability p c ≤ 1 that will eradicate the disease. (ii) for morbidity relative risks between the low and high morbidity thresholds r < r < r , there are three Nash equilibria with two of them being ESV strategies. This phenomenon is not captured by the SIR model, studied in Bauch and Earn (2004) , and introduces two scenarios with relevant and opposite features: the low-vaccination scenario where individuals will vaccinate with a low probability; and the high-vaccination scenario where individuals will vaccinate with a high probability. (iii) for morbidity relative risks above the high morbidity threshold r > r , there is only one ESV strategy that is the low-vaccination scenario, and so there is the urge to do a vaccination program that reduces the morbidity relative risk, to promote vaccination for part of the population and, if possible, to introduce a new vaccine.
Evolutionary Vaccination Dynamics
Based on the replicator dynamics theory, we introduce on the SIRI model the evolutionary vaccination dynamics for an homogeneous vaccination strategy p of the population, where the individuals change their strategies along time, such that their payoffs increase (Maynard-Smith 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Bauch 2005; Nowak 2006; Cojocaru et al. 2007 ).
For the evolutionary vaccination dynamics, we prove that: (i) the ESV strategies are attractors of the dynamics; and (ii) the Nash equilibria that are not ESV strategies are boundaries of the basin of attractions of the ESV strategies.
Consider that a small group, of size ε, opts to change its vaccination strategy from the population vaccination strategy P to P + P. The payoff gain function satisfies
The evolutionary vaccination dynamics is given by
where α( p) ≥ 0 is a smooth map that measures the vaccination strategy adaptation speed of the population and might depend upon the parameters of the SIRI model and of the relative morbidity risk r . A point p is a dynamic equilibrium if, and only if, d p/dτ = 0. Hence, a point p is a dynamic equilibrium if, and only if,
As usual, we assume the following on the vaccination strategy adaptation speed α: 
In the case of an ideal situation, where the morbidity relative risks r = 0, Theorem 6 indicates that, for R 0 < 1/σ , the vaccination population strategy tends to p c and so the disease is eradicated. For R 0 ≥ 1/σ , the vaccination population strategy tends to 1, meaning that all susceptible, or newborns, get vaccinated but new measures, like to vaccine the recovered should be taken to eradicate the disease.
Let us introduce the function
to simplify the presentation of the proofs of Theorems 6, 7 and 8.
Proof of Theorem 6
Case (i) R 0 < 1/σ . By Lemma 4, for every p * ∈ [p c , 1], π( p * ) = 0 = r . Hence, F( p * ) = 0, and so p * is an equilibrium point. For small basic reproductive ratios, the vaccination population strategy tends to p E . If the morbidity relative risks are small, p E is close to p c (the case r = 0) and so the disease is close to eradication. However, if the morbidity relative risks are large, then p E is close to 0 and so the vaccination is not effective. Hence, the vaccination programs have the goal to keep the morbidity relative risks small.
Proof of Theorem 7
Case (i) r > π(0). Since p E = 0 and π(0) < r , we get that α(0) = 0, and so 0 is a Nash equilibrium. For every q ∈ [0, 1], π(q) ≤ π(0) < r , and so F(q) < 0. Hence, lim t→+∞ p(t; q) = 0, and so 0 is a global attractor. Case (ii) 0 < r ≤ π(0). Hence, π(P E ) = r and so p E is a Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 5, for every q ∈ [0, p E ), π(q) > r , and so F(q) > 0. 
Proof of Theorem 8
Case (i) r = r . Hence, π(0) = r = r , and so 0 is a dynamic equilibrium. Case (ii) r > r . Hence, π(0) = r < r , and so α(0) = 0. Thus, 0 is a dynamic equilibrium. Let us consider large basic reproductive ratios R 0 > R B and so r < r . First period: Suppose that the true relative morbidity risk r T ∈ (r , r ) and the population vaccination strategy is in the high-vaccination scenario with P T . Second period: A false vaccine scare occurs and the relative morbidity risk rises above the high morbidity threshold r F > r . Hence the vaccination dynamics will lead the population vaccination strategy to the only stable equilibria that is P F = 0. Hence, the individuals get totally unprotected. Third period: A vaccination program is implemented to restore the true relative morbidity risk r T ∈ (r , r ). Now, the population vaccination strategy keeps being trapped in the low-vaccination scenario P F = 0, that is an attractor, and it is not able to move to the high-vaccination scenario. Hence, the vaccination program to be efficient has to offer vaccines or to make the vaccine compulsory to part of the population to increase, in this way, the population vaccination strategy above the probability of the Nash vaccination equilibrium, that is not a weak ESV strategy, P N . Only now the vaccination dynamics can start helping the population to evolve and reach the initial equilibrium P T .
We observe that if the true relative morbidity risk is below the low morbidity threshold r T < r then the vaccination program to be efficient might have not to offer vaccines or to make the vaccine compulsory because the vaccination dynamics will drive the population strategy to the high-vaccination scenario. However, it might take too long to achieve the ESV strategy equilibrium and, again, an extra incentive like to offer vaccines or to make the vaccine compulsory for part of the population might be needed.
Conclusions
We made an analyzes of the SIRI susceptible, or newborns, vaccination model. For high values of the large basic reproductive ratios R 0 , there are the low morbidity threshold r and the high morbidity threshold r with the following property: For every relative morbidity risk r < r < r there are two ESV strategies: the low-vaccination scenario where individuals will vaccinate with a low probability; and the high-vaccination scenario where individuals will vaccinate with a high probability. We introduce the evolutionary vaccination dynamics and prove that these two ESV are attractors and have a common boundary point, in their basins of attraction, consisting of a Nash equilibrium that is not an ESV strategy. Hence, the evolutionary vaccination dynamics is bistable. The existence of these two vaccination scenarios contrasts with the previous studies for the SIR model, where there is only a single vaccination scenario for the same level of the morbidity relative risk (Bauch and Earn 2004) . The appearance of different vaccination scenarios is due to the partial immunity in the SIRI epidemic model. We show that the vaccination expected payoff is smaller at the low-vaccination scenario than at the high-vaccination scenario. We study the effect of vaccine scares and the effect of vaccination education programs. A vaccine scare can wrongly increase the perception of the morbidity relative risk above the high morbidity threshold r and so the population will change its vaccination strategy moving from the highvaccination scenario to the low-vaccination scenario. Hence, when a vaccine scare emerges it is very important to have, immediately, an effective vaccination education program to decrease the value of the perceived morbidity relative risk. To drive the population from a low-vaccination scenario to a high-vaccination scenario, we observe that a vaccination education program will have not only to advertise the advantages of the vaccine but will also have to give an incentive to increase the probability of vaccination, like to offer the vaccines or, even, to make it compulsory for part of the population. Future work can consist in analyzing other epidemiological models and do a comparative study with the results obtained for the SIR model and for the reinfection SIRI model. In particular, (i) to consider distinct compartments for recovered and vaccinated individuals to study different levels of immunity after recovery from natural infections and after vaccination (Alexander et al. 2004 ); (ii) to consider different strains in the epidemic model and to study the effects of imperfect vaccines (Nuño et al. 2005) ; and (iii) to endogenize the side effects of vaccination or the available information of education campaigns and to introduce higher death rates for infected individuals. 
